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1. Introduction
Tarun Kattumana’s argues that the epistemological underpinning of so-called Evidence Based
Medicine (EBM), is a distal contributing factor in the growing scepticism regarding the safety and
efficacy of vaccines for preventing infectious disease such as measles, mumps and rubella. The
epistemology underlying EBM rests on the positivist assumption that medical knowledge must be
based on objective value-free facts that abstract from the particularities of situations and persons.
(Whether this epistemology is sound is a whole other debate, although Kattumana’s admits on
pragmatic grounds that it works.) That is, at its highest levels, medical knowledge applies to
populations rather than to individuals, which Kattumana’s calls a ‘gap’ and a gap that, according
to some bioethicists, creates conflicts on the part of physicians whose patients are involved in
medical experiments between their roles as scientists and their duties to the research community
vs. their role as therapists and their duties to their patients (Freedman, 1987; Hellman & Hellman,
1991). According to Kattumana’s, medical evidence for the safety and efficacy of vaccines that
abstracts from particularities at the highest levels of medical research, viz., randomized clinical
trials and meta-analyses, is conveyed to lay persons by the medical establishment in a futile attempt
to convince them that they and their children should be vaccinated against a variety of infectious
diseases. As Kattumana’s contends, lay persons are not convinced by the experimental evidence
for the effectiveness of vaccines since that evidence is dry, clinical and irrelevant to the
particularities of their life situations. It does not ‘speak’ to them. His suggestion is that the
presentation of this dry evidence to the general public causally contributes to the hesitancy of
people to vaccinate themselves because of its irrelevance to their lives and situations.
In this short critique, I shall argue that it is not the role of medical researchers to convince
lay persons about their results, but rather to convince the medical community about these results
in an effort to break an epistemological deadlock, referred to by Freedman (1987) as clinical
equipoise. As Miller and Brody (2003) contend, the view that there is a gap between medical
research and the interests of individual patients rests on the faulty assumption that medical research
has therapeutic obligations. They argue that the role of research is not to help individuals
therapeutically, but rather it is aimed at achieving the greater good of populations by reducing
clinical equipoise using randomized clinical trials and meta-analyses (Miller & Brody, 2003). If
Miller and Brody (2003) are correct in their view of the role of medical research, the abstraction
from particularities are not shortcomings nor limitations of this research but rather a cornerstone
feature. Thus, it is unlikely that randomized clinical trials are the primary culprits in vaccine
hesitancy. Afterall, how many lay people read medical journals?
If people are hesitant about vaccines, it is likely due to other factors, some of which are
mentioned by Kattumana’s early on in his paper although ignored later on, such as misinformation
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and the fact that many infectious diseases are under control, so that people let their guard down
given that there is no sense of urgency. However, when an epidemic or pandemic are new and
acute, people generally have faith in the medical community regarding the efficacy of a given
vaccine. As a case in point, when the Salk vaccine was under development, parents were desperate
to find a way of alleviating the disease in their children and so there was virtually no hesitancy
regarding the vaccine (Dawson, 2004). Also, in the context of the current pandemic, there is a
desperate hope on the part of both the medical and lay communities that a vaccine to combat
COVID-19 will be found, regardless of the dry clinical research being done to find the vaccine. A
recent poll suggests that 72% of Canadians favour mandatory vaccination for COVID-19.1 Then
it is unlikely that the dry value-free population-level clinical trials are culprits in vaccine
scepticism. As Kattumana’s admits, vaccine scepticism is an emergent phenomenon that largely
occurs after an infectious disease has been reduced in frequency and is no longer perceived as a
threat. This relaxed view of the illness gives a toe-hold for anti-vaccination propaganda to affect
public opinion. I shall argue that if we are to remedy the hesitancy about vaccines in cases where
this hesitancy is not warranted or even dangerous, it is important to tackle the major determinants
of this scepticism and to leave medical research alone to do what it does best: research and not
public relations or therapy.
2. Vindicating Randomized Clinical Trials (RCTs) as culprits in vaccine hesitancy
RCTs are not the culprit with regards to vaccine hesitancy. They are minding their own business,
which is to provide evidence that has the potential to break the epistemological deadlock regarding
the efficacy or safety of a given vaccine or medical treatment. Breaking the deadlock, which
violates clinical equipoise, is for the common good rather than for the interests of any particular
individual. Moreover, the audience for RCTs is not the average lay person but rather medical
researchers. The gap referred to by Kattumana between the interests of the individual vs. the
concerns of the medical community is non-existent in the context of medical research, since the
aim of RCTS is to inform the medical community only. It follows that there is no tension between
individuals and the general population in medical research given the division of labour between
medical practice and medical research, a point that is made by Brody and Miller (2003) where they
argue that medical research is science whereas medical practice is therapy. According to Brody
and Miller (2003), the so-called therapeutic misconception occurs with respect to medical research
when it is assumed that medical research has a therapeutic aim, when in fact it’s only aim is
scientific research.
It is worth nothing that the authors contend that clinical equipoise, although a part of
medical research (while not the whole story given the use of placebos as negative controls), is not
a part of the moral justification of medical research since such research has no therapeutic
obligations (Miller & Brody, 2003). Just as medical research has no therapeutic aims, it could also
be argued that the job of medical researchers is not to convince the lay community of their results
and that in fact the view that they do have this obligation is another kind of misconception about
scientific research – let’s call it the ‘public relations’ misconception. Granted, scientific
researchers DO have the duty to convince both fellow researchers and the lay public that this
research is ethical in light of the Nuremberg and Helsinki Declarations, although they have no
obligation to convince the public that they should vaccinate or take this medication or that
medication. The idea that medical research has the duty to over-ride vaccination hesitancy rests on
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a category mistake – the mistake of placing research into the category of therapy or the category
of public relations.
3. A Major Culprit in Vaccine Hesitancy: Complacency in the context of decreased urgency
It is human nature to drop one’s guard when a crisis appears to have abated or if there is no
evidence of a crisis. In times of war, if the enemy has stopped attacking or not yet attacked, the
other side may wrongly assume that they are safe only to be attacked from a flank they didn’t
expect. Witness the attack on Pearl Harbour by Japan in 1941 when the Americans had assumed
that there was no imminent threat from Japan, and so there were no preventative measures taken
to avert any possible attacks. Complacency had resulted from a reduced sense of urgency. The
same phenomenon can happen in the case of epidemics and pandemics. For example, in the current
COVID-19 pandemic, it took Canada and the United States a long time to implement social
distancing measures given the initial low incidence of the disease in those countries. There was no
perceived threat and therefore no real measures were taken until the disease incidence started to
increase exponentially. Now that social distancing has been in effect for several months in these
countries, some cities are opening up in phases due to an apparent flattening of the disease curve
resulting in a reduced perceived threat. This may work or it may backfire as there could be a second
wave of the virus as result of the slackening of restrictions and a feeling of complacency. Similarly,
after the use of the MMR vaccine, parents and medical personnel developed a sense of
complacency since no-one had actually witnessed a case of the measles, which resulted in a
significant decrease of vaccinations and which also negatively impacted herd immunity (Jewell,
2001). As a result of the MMR vaccine hesitancy, there has been a significant increase in the
incidence of measles (Jewell, 2001). Echoing what has been reported by Jewell (2001), a recent
United Nations (UN) report claims that vaccine hesitancy in the case of measles is the direct result
of complacency that has resulted from a decreased incidence of the disease.2 Whereas, as noted
above, vaccine hesitancy is much less of a phenomenon when there is an acute or ongoing health
crisis as was the case with polio in the 1950s (Dawson, 2004).
At the same time, it should be noted that I am not arguing that people should never hesitate
or refuse to vaccinate. Some contemporary cases of polio have resulted from attenuated vaccines,
where the attenuated virus mutates to become virulent as is outlined in a recent report by the World
Heath Organization (WHO).3 This has resulted in so-called vaccine-derived cases of polio, which
is why polio has not been entirely eradicated.3 So admittedly, in some cases, vaccine hesitancy
may be warranted if based on accurate medical information. However, the primary issue that I am
addressing is not whether vaccine hesitancy is ever warranted, but rather what causes vaccine
hesitancy. Given that vaccine hesitancy has resulted from complacency due to a lack of urgency,
this relaxed stance naturally predisposes people to be persuaded more easily by misinformation,
which results in the vaccine being perceived as a bigger threat than the disease that it is used to
prevent.
4. The biggest culprit in vaccine hesitancy: Public misinformation
According to Larson (2018), vaccine hesitancy is largely due to misinformation about vaccines,
especially given the speed at which information is conveyed to people over the internet. The author
suggests several strategies for countering this misinformation, such as making people aware of the
risks associated with the disease along with providing examples of people who have succumbed
to the disease, a strategy which has been adopted by the Danish and Irish governments regarding
vaccines to prevent cervical cancer (Larson, 2018). These counter-misinformation techniques
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appear to be working since there had been an increase in vaccinations of 6% in Ireland following
the implementation of these strategies (Larson, 2018). Notice that there is no mention of making
evidence based medical research less populational in orientation to combat unwarranted vaccine
hesitancy.
The misinformation with which the lay public is inundated takes many forms according to
Smith (2017), including but not limited to claims that vaccines are toxic because they contain antifreeze or mercury, that vaccines are promoted by big Pharmaceutical companies for profit, that
children’s immune systems cannot handle vaccines, that disease incidence will decrease without
vaccines, that natural immunity is better than vaccine-mediated immunity and so forth. As
suggested above, in a relaxed state where there is no sense of urgency, people will be much more
receptive to these likely fraudulent claims. Moreover, these passionate anti-vaccination arguments
do not occur in a vacuum. Rather, there is an established network of powerful and highly influential
individuals who perpetuate these arguments in the spirit of propaganda (Smith, 2017). Antivaccination arguments is big business.
According to Smith (2017), anti-vaccination arguments originate from a number of very
influential people who are celebrities, such as the social activist and son of the late Senator Robert
Kennedy, Robert F. Kennedy Jr., as well as the actor Jenny McCarthy, J.B. Handley (an antivaccination activist who has an autistic child) and a number of other celebrities. On the other hand
a number of established and respected physicians including Tori Bank, Robert Sears, Andrew
Wakefield, and a host of others have also adopted the anti-vaccination stand. Thus, it is no surprise
that people in a relaxed state will be influenced by the arguments of celebrities and respected
physicians. While reserving judgment regarding the anti-vaccination arguments of the established
physicians in this group, a case could be made that the fallacy of false appeal to authority underlies
the arguments proposed by the celebrities in this group. However, people are not always persuaded
by ‘experts’ but rather by people that they hold in high esteem. As a case in point, witness the
credibility given to President Trump in the United States by his advocates. It is the strong network
of individuals respected by most lay people and their potentially spurious arguments that contribute
to vaccine hesitancy rather than dry scientific practice.
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